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INTRODUCTION 
Take-over schemes and mergers in New Zealand are 
regulated by the provisions of the Companies 
Amendment Act 19 63 , (l) which came into force on 
1 January 19 64. The Act was the first legislative 
attempt in New Zealand to ~al with take-overs 
and mergers. Since its enactment, the Act has 
bee n the subject of criticism to the effect that 
it is too restricted in those take-over schemes 
to which it applies. The Act has also been 
criticised on the ground that where a take-over 
scheme is within the scope of the Act, the Act 
is not sufficiently comprehensive to control many 
of the current practices that may be employed 
in the course of a take-over scheme. 
Since the Act came into force, it has been considered 
by the New Zealand Special Committee to Review 
the Companies Act( 2 ) which reported to the Minister 
of Justice in 1973. 
In its Report, (
3
) the Macarthur Committee expressed 
the view that while the Act, since coming into force, 
had worked "reasonably satisfactorily" in regulating 
(1) Hereinafter referred to as "the Act". 
(2) The "Macarthur Committee". 
(3) The "Macarthur Report". 
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take-over schemes, a number of amendments were 
desirable if the Act was to effectively achieve 
its intended purpose. 
A number of developments have also taken place 
overseas in the legislative control of take-over 
schemes. Of particular interest are developments 
in Australia where, in 19 69, the Company Law 
Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys - General( 4 ) furnished its Second Interim 
Report, ( 5 ) Section C of which deals with take-over 
offers. Many of the Eggleston Committee's 
recommendations in respect of the legislative 
control of take-over offers have been incorporated 
into Australian legislation in Part VII B of the 
Companies Act 19 61 (Commonwealth) which came into 
force on l January 1972. 
In this paper it is not intended to question the 
need for the regulation by statute of take-over 
schemes by which an offeror intends to gain effective 
control over the offeree company. It is accepted 
that statutory control of such take-over schemes 
is both necessary and desirable. In particular, 
it is accepted that it is necessary to ensure an 
(4) The "Eggleston Committee". 
(5) The "Eggleston Report". 
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offeree has adequate information upon which to 
decide whether an offer to acquire his shares 
should be accepted, and sufficient time in which 
to consider the merits of the offer and, if 
necessary, to seek advice. It is also accepted 
that it is necessary to ensure that public 
confidence in the share-market is maintained not 
only by protecting the offeree, but by ensuring 
that when a take-over offer is made, it is not 
made in secrecy, but that notification of the offer 
is given to all members of the offeree company, 
the Stock Exchange, and the Registrar of Companies. 
The purpose of this paper is not to traverse the 
subject of take-over bids and their statutory 
control generally, as this is a matter which is 
adequately discussed elsewhere. ( 6 ) Rather it 
is proposed to confine the scope of this paper 
to a consideration of some of the ways in which 
the Act may no longer be regarded as being 
reasonably satisfactory in regulating take-over 
schemes in New Zealand. It is proposed to examine 
some of the recent developments relating to take-over 
schemes and to consider whether it is desirable that 
New Zealand should adopt more comprehensive legislation 
to regulate take-over schemes, having particular 
regard to current Australian legislation. 
(6) _Paterson R.K. "Take-over bids and the Companies Act" 
(1970) 5 V.U.W.L.R. 447. 
4. 
THE SCOPE OF THE ACT 
1.1 The Act applies to take-over schemes which 
are within the definition of that expression 
contained i / Section 2(1) of the Act: 
"'Take-over scheme' means a scheme 
involving the making of offers for 
the acquisition of any shares in a 
company which, together with shares, 
if any, to which the offeror is 
already beneficially entitled, carry 
the right to exercise or control 
the exercise of more than half the 
voting power at any general meeting 
of the offeree company". 
The expression 1 shares to which the offeror is 
beneficially entitled' is defined by Section 2(2) 
of the Act to include: 
"(a) Shares which the offeror is or will 
be entitled to acquire under any 
option or on the fulfilment of any 
condition under any agreement 
relating to the acquisition of any 
other shares in the offeree company~ 
and 
(b) If the offeror is a company within 
the meaning of Section 158 of the 
principal Act, shares to which 
any subsidiary or holding company 
of the offeror or any other 
subsidiary of the offeror's holding 
company is already beneficially 
entitled, or which any such 
subsidiary or holding company is 
or will be entitled to acquire 
in any such manner as aforesaid." 
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Section 3 provides that the Act does not apply 
to an offer made pursuant to a take-over scheme 
involving the acquisition of shares in a private 
company if the shareholders in the private company 
have, before the date of the take-over offer, 
consented to the requirements of the Act being 
waived. It also provides that the Act does not 
apply in respect of offers made to not more than 
six members of a company. 
1.2 One important restriction on the scope of 
the Act is that it does not apply to take-over 
offers unless they are made in writing. If an 
offeror carries out a take-over scheme pursuant 
to an oral offer, there need not be compliance 
with the provisions of the Act. ( 7 ). Not surprisingly, 
this limitation on the scope of the Act has evoked 
considerable discussion, (B) with the result that it 
is not necessary to pursue the matter in this paper. 
(7) Multiplex Industries Limited v. Speer [1966] N.Z.L.R. 
122; c;,-.f. Section 66(1) of the Commerce Act 1975 
which defines a take-over "offer" to include any 
proposal to make an offer "whether in writing or not". 
(B)~ "~e Scope and Application of the Companies 
Amendment _Act 1963" (1966) 4 V.U.W.L.R. 149; 
Paterson RK "Take-over Bids and the Companies Act" 
(1970) 5 V.U.W.L.R. 447 at 460 et seq; ~mith W.G. 
"Mergers and Takeovers": Paper presented at a seminar 
conducted by the New Zealand Society of Accountants, 
Wellington Branch, and the Wellington District 
Law Society, V.U.W., 2 Oct 1971. 
6 . 
1.3 In many instances effective control over a 
company may be secured and maintained by the 
acquisition of a number of shares which amounts 
to considerably less than one half of the shares 
carrying voting rights in a company. Such control 
will result not only from the voting power conferred 
by the shares which are held, but also from the 
ability to gain control over the gathering of proxy 
votes. The exercise of the control of a company 
by holding shares which confer less than one half 
of the voting power at a general meeting will be 
facilitated where the remaining shares in the 
company are widely dispersed among a large number 
of shareholders, or where large parcels of shares 
are held by institutional investors which follow 
a policy of non-interference in the management 
of a company as long as the management is not acting 
against the interest of the shareholders. While 
holding less than one half of those shares which 
confer a right to vote at a general meeting of a 
company will not allow an alteration to the articles 
or a disposition of assets of the company in which 
the shares are held, it may allow the holder of 
the shares to appoint directors and thereby 
influence the day to day management of the company. 
7. 
1.4 By restricting the scope of the Act to take-over 
schemes in which an offerer is seeking to acquire 
a sufficient number of shares to confer the right 
to exercise (or control the exercise of) more than 
half the voting power at any general meeting of the 
offeree company, the effectiveness of the Act is 
severely curtailed. Furthermore, the Act is 
concerned only with the acquisition of voting shares 
and has no application in circumstances where an 
offeror seeks to acquire non-voting shares in 
a company, even if all the non-voting shares in 
a company, or all the non-voting shares in a class, 
are sought. 
1.5 The scope of the Act may be contrasted with 
the approach adopted in Section 180C of the Companies 
Act 1961 in Australia. Section 180C, which is 
concerned with take-over offers, applies to any offer 
for shares in a company unless such an offer is 
expressly excluded by the terms of the Section. 
One of the important exceptions contained in the 
Section is an offer to acquire voting shares if 
the offer, when accepted, would not give the offerer 
control of 15 per cent of the voting power of the 
company. Prior to Section l80C, coming into force 
in 1972, take-over schemes were within the scope 
8. 
of the Act only if offers made pursuant to the 
scheme could have given the offeror control of 
third of the voting power of a company.< 9 ) one 
The lower percentage was recommended by the Report 
of the Eggleston Committee which recognised that 
where shares in a public company are widely held, 
"it is unlikely that any one shareholder would 
need to control as much as one third of the voting 
power to gain control of the company". (lO) Apart 
from normal stock exchange trading, (ll) there 
are five situations in which~ ction 180C of the 
Companies Act 1961 dces not apply, and these may be 
summarised as follows: offers involving the 
acquisition of less than fifteen percent of the 
voting power in a company; offers where the offeror 
has made not more than three offers or invitations 
relating to the acquisition of shares in a company 
to more than three members of the company within 
the proceeding four months; offers to acquire 
non-voting shares unless the offeror proposes to 
acquire all the non-voting shares in a company or 
all the non-voting shares in a class are to be 
acquired; an offer to acquire shares in a company 
that does not have more than fifteen members; and 
(9) S.184 Companies Act. 
(10) Para 27. 
(11) See S.180C (7) provides that for the purposes 
of the Section, an "offer" does not include an 
offer "made at an official meeting of a Stock Exchange 
in the ordinary course of trading on the Stock Exchange". 
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an offer to acquire shares in a proprietary company 
that has more than fifteen members if the members 
of the company have consented in writing to the 
provisions of Part VIIB of the Companies Act 1961 
not applying to the offer. (l 2 ) 
1.6 In Ontario, Canada, the Securities Act was 
enacted in 1966 embodying many of the recommendations 
of the Report of the Attorney-General's Committee 
S 't' L . 1 t' . . (l
3 ) P X on ecuri ies egis a ion in Ontario. art I 
of the Securities Act deals specifically with 
take-overs and applies where the offerer makes 
an offer to Ontario shareholders to purchase 
sufficient shares to give the offerer control of 
one fifth of the voting power in the offeree company. 
1.7 In its Report, the Macarthur Committee compared 
the provision in the Act defining a take-over 
scheme with the corresponding provision in the 
Australian legislation, and also with the provisions 
of The Overseas Take-overs Regulations 1964. (l4 ) 
The Regulations contain a definition of the expression 
"take-over scheme" which is identical with that 
contained in the Act, (l5 ) except that the Regulations 
(16) 
operate on a 25 percent measure of control. 
(12) S.180C(2)(a)-(e). (13) The Report of the "Kimber 
Committee". (14) See now The Overseas 
Investment Regulations 1974. 
( 15) Reg. 2 ( l) 
(16) As does the Commerce Act 1975 in relation to 
"Aggregation Proposals": S.66(1). 
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The Cormnittee took the view that the Australian 
legislation, and the Regulations, recognises that 
it is possible to obtain control of a company 
with 50 percent or less of the voting power. 
Accordingly the Cormnittee recormnended an amendment 
to the Act: 
"After consideration we would recormnend 
in the light of conditions obtaining in 
New Zealand that the definition of the 
term "take-over scheme" be altered and 
made to apply to any scheme whereby 
control is sought over 25 percent or 
more of the voting power of an offeree 
company. This would of course include 
any shares already beneficially held".(17) 
1.8 Whether the degree of control at which the Act 
becomes operational is maintained at its present 
figure or reduced to a lower figure, clarification 
of the Act is required to ensure that only 
those transactions which will actually confer the 
selected degree of control come within the scope 
of the Act and that where an offerer may already 
exercise that degree of control, further compliance 
with the Act is not required. At present the 
Act may be interpreted as requiring an offeror who 
already holds a majority of the voting shares in 
a company to comply with the requirements of the 
Act where offers are made to acquire further shares. 
( 1 7) Para. 348. 
11. 
'FIRST COME, FIRST SERVED' BIDS 
2.1 The Act has also been criticised insofar as 
"first come, first served" offers are concerned. 
Such an offer is made when the buyer, usually 
acting through a broker or some other agent, indicates 
that he is prepared to receive offers from shareholders 
to sell their shares at a price stated by the 
buyer. Such an invitation will state that the 
offers will be accepted in the order of priority 
in which they are received, up to a stated percentage 
of the share capital. (l8 ) 
2.2 If by making such an offer it is intended to 
obtain the right to exercise more than one half 
of the voting power at a general meeting of the 
offeree company, then the question arises of whether 
the Act will apply. In Multiplex Industries Limited v. 
Speer, (l9 ) Tompkins J. was firmly of the view that 
the Act did apply: 
"Section 2 says 'offer includes an 
invitation to make an offer'. Thus, 
for the purposes of the Act, the word 
'offer' is given an enlarged and 
unusual meaning ..•...... what reasonable 
meaning can be given to the extended 
definition of 'offer' if it does not 
mean an invitation to a shareholder 
to sell his shares? ............... . 
(18) An example of a "first come, first served" bid is 
provided by the A.S. Paterson & Company Limited bid for 
a minority interest in A.B. Consolidated Limited, 
discussed infra para. 3. 
(19) [1965] N.Z.L.R. 592. 
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I think the only sensible interpretation 
of the definition of 'offer' is that it 
means that it includes an invitation 
by a take-over offeror to a shareholder 
to sell his shares pursuant to a take-
over scheme".(20) 
Thus, the learned Judge was able to conclude that 
an invitation to make an offer to sell shares to 
the 11 offeror 11 under a take-over scheme was sufficient 
to constitute a take-over offer for the purposes 
of the Act. However, the invitation to shareholders 
in the offeree company must have been made, and 
the invitation must be made by (or on behalf of) 
the person intending to acquire the controlling 
interest in the offeree company.( 2l) 
2.3 The Court of Appeal appears to have taken a 
similar view: 
"If an invitee, looking at a document 
placed before him and without spoken 
words orally communicated to him 
collaterally, can fairly deduce from the 
document before him that he is invited 
to make an offer upon certain terms, 
then, no doubt, whether the word 
"invited" or any other word is used or 
not, the document may be construed 
as a written invitation; but if the 
document merely sets out the terms of 
some contemplated or suggested offer, 
but its words convey no invitation 
expressly or impliedly to make such an 
offer, and if such an invitation is 
in fact made orally, then I am clear that 
there is no written invitation to make 
(20) Ibid_p.602. 
(21) Ib;id. 
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an offer. What is in writing is the 
terms upon which the invitee is orally 
invited to make an offer, and no more".(22) 
The Court held that, on a consideration of the facts 
of the case, there were no words either express 
or implied in the documents in question making 
any invitation to make an offer. Such invitation 
as was made was an oral offer and therefore the 
Act did not apply. 
2.4 In Australia, Part VIB of the Companies Act 
1961 t . . . 1 t' . 't t' ( 23 ) con ains provisions regu a ing invi a ions, 
requiring the same procedure to be followed as 
that which must be followed when a take-over scheme 
is carried out pursuant to a take-over offer. 
The Eggleston Report recognised that invitations 
are often associated with a number of undesirable 
(24) features. The Committee's principal concern 
was that an invitation to offer shares for sale 
did not come within the provisions of the now-repealed 
Section 184 of the Companies Act 1961, the result 
being that a person making an invitation to acquire 
shares could make that invitation with the intention 
of acquiring more than one third of the voting shares 
in a company without being required to follow the 
take-over procedure required by the Act. However, 
the Committee also pointed out that by making an 
(22) [1966] N.Z.L.R. 122 per Turner J. at p.141. 
(23) S.180C (3)-(5). 
(24) Para. 22. .... 
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invitation through an agent, the bidder could 
avoid disclosing his identity, and that as sellers 
do not know whether the buyer intends to accept 
more than the percentage he has stated he will 
accept, the shareholder may be required to make 
an immediate decision without the advantage of the 
information that must be provided where a take-over 
scheme is within the terms of Section 184. As 
the Report of the Committee points out, 
"Inequality between shareholders is 
inevitable since many will be unaware 
of the offer until too late".(25) 
2.5 The Macarthur Committee saw the principal 
disadvantage of the 'first come, first served' 
offer as allowing a bidder to become the effective 
controller of a company without the necessity 
of complying with the requirements of the Act. 
However, the Committee was unable to agree with 
the suggestion that 'first come, first served' 
offers are sufficiently undesirable to warrant 
prohibition. After considering the recommendations 
of the Company Law Committee in the United Kingdom( 26 ) 
and requirement of United States law that shares 
be taken up by the purchaser on a pro-rata basis, 
the Macarthur Committee recommended that where the 
acceptance of an offer made in response to an 
(25) Para 22(e). 
(26) The "Jenkins Committee". 
I . , 
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invitation to offer shares for sale would result 
in the purchaser of those shares gaining 25 percent 
or more of the voting power in a company, there 
must be compliance with the requirements of the 
Act. ( 27 ) In addition, the Committee recommended 
that any persons making a 'first come, first served' 
offer should be required to state the maximum 
number of shares intended to be acquired, and the 
number of shares in the offeree company to which 
that person is beneficially entitled. ( 28 ) However, 
the Committee apparently thought it unnecessary 
to recommend the adoption of a requirement similar 
to that embodied in United States legislation 
whereby a shareholder has ten days from the publication 
or mailing of the offer in which to act. By 
bringing within the scope of the Act an offer, the 
acceptance of which would result in the offeror 
gaining at least 25 per cent of the voting power 
in a company, the Committee appears to have considered 
a shareholder to be adequately protected. However, 
it would still be possible, by means of a 'first 
come, first served' offer together with the purchase 
of shares on the Stock Exchange at a later date, 
for effective control of a company to be acquired 
principally as the result of a 'first come, first 
served' offer that would be outside the scope of 
the Act. This is the very consequence the Committee 
was seeking to prevent. 
(27) Para 349. (28) Para 360(c). 
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2.6 In 1971 the Stock Exchange of New Zealand 
adopted its own rules setting out the terms on 
which its members may act in a 'first come, first 
served' offer. These rules require disclosure 
by the offeror of information which includes the 
maximum number of shares it is intended to acquire 
and the percentage of the capital of the offeree 
company which (together with any shares already 
beneficially held) it is sought to acquire. The 
rules provide 'first come, first served' offers 
must be "wholly for cash". The rules (which apply 
only to members of the Stock Exchange) do not 
give offerees any minimum time in which to decide 
whether they will dispose of their shares and allow 
an offeror to conceal his identity from the offerees. 
17. 
THE A.S. PATERSON BID FOR A.B. CONSOLIDATED LIMITED 
3.1 The contention that the Act is too restricted in 
its application insofar as the measure of control at 
which it becomes operative is concerned, and in its 
application to 'first come, first served bids'', may 
be supported by reference to the recent take-over 
offer made by A.S. Paterson and Company Limited in 
respect of minority interest in A.B. Consolidated 
Limited. 
3.2 26 April 1976, a firm of merchant bankers acting 
on behalf of A.S. Paterson and Company Limited 
("A.S.P.") announced a 'first come, first served' 
offer by A.S.P. of 50 cents cash for each share in 
A.B. Consolidated Limited ("A.B. Consolidated"). At 
the date the offer was made, A.B. Consolidated shares, 
with a par value of 50 cents, were selling on the 
Stock Exchange at 33 cents. The intention of the 
offeror was to acquire one third of the 7.8 million 
voting shares in A.B. Consolidated, although it 
was announced that A.S.P. would give "favourable 
consideration" to acquiring up to a maximum of 
49 per cent of the ordinary capital of A.B. Consolidated. 
The offer was stated to be conditional upon A.S.P. 
receiving acceptances in respect of 1.9 million 
shares representing approximately 25 per cent of 
18. 
A.B. Consolidated 1 s ordinary capital. Two U.K. 
companies, Associated Biscuit Manufacturers Limited 
and Rowntree Mackintosh Limited, each held 
approximately 10 per cent of the ordinary shares 
in A.B. Consolidated. Thus, if A.S.P. could acquire 
one third of the voting shares in A.B. Consolidated 
and gain the support of these two shareholders, it 
would be able to exercise effective control over 
A.B. Consolidated. 
3.3 A.B. Consolidated was, to a large extent, an 
obvious target for a take-over. Profits in recent 
years had shown a steady decline. In 1966 the 
ratio of after-tax earnings to shareholders funds 
was 8.67 in 1975 this figure was 2.6. In the six 
months ending 30 September 1975 the company had 
made a loss of $240,000. In addition, a substantial 
~xchange loss had been suffered on a 1.5 million 
Eurodollar loan. However, for the year ending 
31 March 1975, for each 50 cent share in A.B. 
Consolidated, there were assets with a nett value 
of $1-12. ' 
3.4 It is interesting to note that the making of a 
'first come, first served' bid caused some confusion 
among Stock Exchange members, some of whom were 
apparently under the impression that they could not 
19. 
act for a company making such a bid. However, the 
matter was clarified by the Stock Exchange Association 
which announced that it had its own regulations 
to deal with such a bid, such rules having been 
developed because 'first come, first served' bids 
had, in the past, proved unsatisfactory for many 
shareholders. ( 29 ) 
3.5 The immediate reaction to the offer by A.S.P. 
was a considerable amount of activity in the trading 
of A.B. Consolidated shares, both on and off the 
Stock Exchange. Within two weeks of the offer being 
made, 20 per cent of the ordinary shares in A.B. 
Consolidated changed hands on the Stock Exchange. 
As the result of purchases by existing shareholders 
in the offeree company, the price of shares in that 
company was being quoted at one or two cents above 
the value of the A.S.P. offer within two days of 
the offer having been made. Such purchases appeared 
to be intertded to discourage offerees from accepting 
the offer from A.S.P. until the directors of 
A.B. Consolidated decided how they would oppose 
the bid. However, when large parcels of shares began 
exchanging hands, it appeared that a rival bid was 
likely. On 5 May 1976 a sale took place involving 
622,000 shares representing approximately 9 per cent 
of A.B. Consolidated's issued capital, and on 
11 May 1976 a further similar sale took place with the 
(29) Supra. para 2.6. 
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price paid for these shares being 10 cents in excess 
of the A.S.P. offer. By this time it became apparent 
many of the shares offered for sale were being 
acquired by Brierley Investments Limited, although 
no doubt speculators had entered the market in the 
expectation of an increased offer from A.S.P., or 
an increase in the price of their shares should 
A.S.P. succeed in their bid and increase the 
profitability of A.B. Consolidated. 
3.6 It is also interesting to note that at this 
time a dispute developed between shareholders in 
A.B. Consolidated who had accepted the A.S.P. offer 
but who had requested the return of their acceptances 
because of the increased market value of the 
shares, and the merchant bank acting for A.S.P. 
who declined to return the acceptances on the 
ground that they were not legally permitted to return 
them. 
3.7 The initial step in the defensive action taken 
by the directors of A.B. Consolidated was to 
announce its improved financial position for the 
year ending 31 March 1976, and declare a tax-free 
dividend of 5 per cent. The directors described 
the A.S.P. offer as "completely inadequate", 
21. 
pointing out that the nett asset backing of each 
A.B. Consolidated share was $1.05, and that if 
the A.S.P. offer was accepted, shareholders would 
not be entitled to participate in the dividend 
"effectively reducing the 50 cent cash bid price 
to 47.5 cents" a share. 
3.8 The principal defensive action taken by the 
directors of A.B. Consolidated was to assist Brierley 
Investments Limited in its acquisition of shares in 
A.B. Consolidated. On 12 May 1976 Brierley 
Investments was able to announce that it held 
25 per cent of the ordinary share capital in A.B. 
Consolidated, such share capital apparently having 
been acquired at a cost of $1.l million. However, 
on 17 May 1976, A.S.P. announced that it held more 
than 25 per cent of the voting shares in A.B. 
Consolidated following the acquisition of the 
shareholding in A.B. Consolidated of Rowntree Mackintosh 
Ltd. In addition, A.S.P. was able to state that 
the other large U.K. shareholder in A.B. Consolidated, 
Associated Biscuit Manufacturers Limited, while 
not disposing of its shares, had sided with A.S.P. 
At the same time it was announced that the take-over 
offer was unconditional, and that the cash offer 
had been increased from 50 cents per share to 
22. 
57½ cents per share. As A.S.P. had, by this time, 
acquired sufficient shares to give it approximately 
30 per cent of the voting control at any general 
meeting of A.B. Consolidated (disregarding the 
fact that its nominee might be appointed proxy by 
the remaining large U.K. shareholder), and as 
the increased offer was to apply to all acceptances 
received by A.S.P., it would appear the increased 
offer was largely intended to quell the dissatisfaction 
of those offerees who had accepted the A.S.P. 
offer of 50 cents and whose requests for the return 
of their forms of acceptance of that offer had 
been declined. These shareholders had indicated 
they were seeking legal advice and on one occasion 
the directors of A.B. Consolidated had closed the 
company's share register "pending legal clarification 
of the Paterson first come, first served offer", 
although it was re-opened when the Stock Exchange 
threatened to suspend trading in the shares of 
A.B. Consolidated. 
3.9 On 19 May 1976 the directors of A.B. Consolidated 
announced the issue of 2,000,000 ordinary shares at 
a par value of 50 cents, a price below both the 
current market value for the shares and the price 
offered by A.S.P. It was explained that the issue 
was part consideration for the acquisition of 
assets in related food and food processing industries, 
23. 
but the recipient of the shares was not disclosed. 
The new share issue represented 25.7 per cent 
of the pre-issue ordinary capital of A.B. Consolidated 
and 20.4 per cent of the post issue capital. 
On 4 June 1976 it was announced that the new share 
issue had been alloted to Brierley Investments 
. . ( 30) 
Limited. In return, A.B. Consolidated had 
acquired the shares of Asparagus Limited, a company 
previously owned by a subsidiary of Brierley 
Investments Limited. The assets of Asparagus Limited, 
consisting principally of an orchard property, 
were valued in the company's accounts in 1975 
at $350,000. 
3.10 The consequences of this share issue were 
that, while prior to the issue A.S.P. held approximately 
33½ per cent of the ordinary share capital in 
A.B. Consolidated, subsequent to this issue this 
figure was reduced to 25 per cent. However, the 
holding of Brierly Investments Limited of 25 per cent 
prior to the issue was increased to approximately 
42 per cent following the issue. 
3.11 ' It is submitted that it would have been 
desirable had the A.S.P. bid for a minority interest 
(30) It would be interesting to speculate whether in 
alloting these shares to defeat the A.S.P. bid there 
was a proper exercise of power on the part of the 
directors of A.B. Consolidated. 
c,. • 
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in A.B. Consolidated been within the scope of the 
Act so that the parties to the scheme would have 
been bound to comply with the requirements of the 
Act. As has been shown, current Australian legislation 
would have covered such a scheme. However, under 
New Zealand legislation, A.S.P. were able to make 
a bid for sufficient voting shares in A.B. Consolidated 
to give it effective control of the company without 
being required to disclose information that may have 
assisted the offerees in making a decision as to 
whether to accept or reject the offer. In particular, 
there was some doubt in the initial stages of the 
bid surrounding the shareholding in A.B. Consolidated 
by A.S.P. which would have been clarified had 
A.S.P. been required to disclose its shareholding 
in A.B. Consolidated. Furthermore, because the bid 
by A.S.P. was outside the scope of the Act, the 
offeree company was not required to issue a statement 
containing the information prescribed by the Second 
Schedule to the Act. The fact that compliance with 
the Act was not required is significant when it is 
considered that without the defensive action taken by 
the directors of the offeree company, it appears 
that A.S.P. would have succeeded in gaining effective 
control of A.B. Consolidated. However, it must be 
conceded that the failure by the offeror to provide 
the offerees with the information specified in 
25. 
First Schedule was not as serious as it might have 
been had A.S.P. not made a cash offer. ( 3l) 
3.12 The result of the contest between A.S.P. and 
Brierley Investments Limited was that, disregarding 
the 2 million shares issued by A.B. Consolidated, 
these two companies acquired approximately 58 per cent 
of the ordinary voting shares in the offeree company 
during a period of just over four weeks. Many 
more shares also changed hands during this period, 
yet the schemes by which this major reconstruction 
in the shareholding of A.B. Consolidated was brought 
about were not within the scope of the Act. 
(31) As the offer was made on behalf of A.S.P . by a 
v merchant bank and not a member of the Stock Exchange, 
this would have been possible (supra para 2.6) . 
26. 
INCREASES IN THE VALUE OF AN OFFER 
4.1 Section 9 of the Act permits an offeror to vary 
the terms of a take-over offer without having to 
repeat the issue of documents required by the Act<
32 ) 
insofar as the variation of the offer increases 
the amount of cash that is offered for the shares 
h . h . t . h . ( 
33 ) d h w ic 1 is soug t to acquire, or exten s t e 
time for the acceptance of the offer. (
34 ) It is 
not uncommon for the date of acceptance of an offer 
to be extended, nor is it uncommon for the price 
offered for the shares to be increased. Where the 
price offered for the shares is increased, the 
question may arise of whether those shareholders 
in the offeree company who have accepted the original 
offer at the lower price are bound to accept that 
price while other shareholders will be entitled to 
receive a higher price for their shares. In its 
report, the Eggleston Committee stated the problem 
in the following terms: 
"Where an offer is made, and is accepted 
by some, and subsequently market pressures 
force the bidder to offer more to the 
remaining shareholders. In such a case 
there are two views possible. One is that 
those who came in early should receive 
(32) ¥ut notice of the variation 
the ifferee company: S.9(2). 
(33) S.9(1) (a). 
( 34) S. 9 ( 1) ( b) . 
must be served on 
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the same benefits as those who held 
out. The other is that, provided each 
was given time to consider, the early 
acceptors, who were presumably more 
anxious that the deal should go through, 
should not share in the benefits 
obtained by the more cautious or more 
reluctant shareholders who forced an 
increase in the price''.(35) 
The Committee took the view that the better 
solution would be to require that an offeror who 
increases the price offered to some shareholders 
must pay the increased price to those who have 
already accepted his offer. 
4.2 Section 180 L of the Australian Act now 
provides that where the consideration that is 
offered for shares it is proposed to acquire pursuant 
to a take-over scheme is increased, each person 
whose shares are acquired either before or after 
the consideration is increased is entitled to 
receive that increased consideration. As a corollary, 
Section 180 M provides that while a take-over 
offer is open, no person whose shares may be acquired 
under the take-over scheme may be given any benefit 
(except in pursuance of a variation made in 
accordance with Section 180 L of the Act) which 
has not been provided for by the original take-over 
offer. 
(35) para 1 8 (b). 
28. 
4.3 According to the ordinary principles of contract, 
it would appear that in New Zealand, as the Act 
stands at present, once an offer is declared unconditional 
by an offeror, shareholders who have agreed to 
part with their shares at a lower price than others 
will be bound to accept that lower price. This 
view would appear to accord with that of the Macarthur 
Committee which stated in its report that while 
the Act was not clear as to whether shareholders 
who have accepted an offer at the first and lower 
price are bound to accept that lower price, it may 
well be the case that they are so bound. Accordingly 
the Committee recommended "that if the price of 
an offer is increased, it should apply to all the 
acceptors". ( 3 6 ) 
4.4 The Committee could see no reason why Section 9 
(l)(a) of the Act should give an exemption relating 
to the variation of an offer by increasing "the amount 
of any cash sum that is offered as consideration or 
part consideration for the shares that are proposed 
to be acquired", without giving a similar exemption 
to an increased offer of securities. The Committee 
recommended: 
"That Section 9 be extended so that 
a variation of offer without further 
compliance be permitted in the case 
(36) para 360(h). Where the Stock Exchange rules in respect 
of 'first come, first served offers' apply (supra para 2. 6 ) 
a bidder is required to undertake that he will not make a 
higher offer within a specified period unless earlier 
acceptors also get the higher price. 
29. 
of an increased offer of securities 
in respect of the same class included 
in the original offer".(37) 
Section 180 (L) of the Australian Companies Act 
permits an offer to be increased without further 
compliance with the provisions of that Act not 
only where the increased consideration is in the 
form of cash, but also where it is in the form 
of shares, stock, debentures or an option to 
acquire unissued shares. ( 33 ) 
(37) para 360(1). 
(38) S.180L (2) (a)-(f). 
30. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY 
5.1 A take-over offer which is required to comply 
with the First Schedule to the Act will generally 
have attached to it a form whereby the offeree may 
signify his acceptance of the offer to acquire his 
shares. This form of acceptance, when executed 
by the offeree, may merely recite the fact that the 
offer has been accepted. However, if the directors 
of the offeree company are likely to be opposed 
to the take-over offer, a power of attorney may 
be incorporated into the form of acceptance appointing 
the offerer the proxy of the offeree, (or if the 
offerer is a company, appointing the offeror 
the proxy of the offeree with a power of substitution 
by the offerer to appoint persons to act on its 
behalf). The effect of this power of attorney will 
be to allow the offerer to attend any general 
meeting of the offeree company and to exercise the 
offeree's vote at that meeting. 
5. 2 The significar:ce of including a power of attorney 
in the form of acceptance may be illustrated by 
refe rring to the rece nt take-over offer made by 
The Southland Frozen Meat and Produce Export Company 
Limited ( 11 S.F.M. 11 ) for 51 per cent of the ordinary 
share s in The Ne w Zealand Refrigerating Company Limited 
31. 
("N.Z. Refrigerating"). Included in the form of 
acceptance provided to offeress by SFM was a provision 
whereby the offerees agreed to: 
"Authorise and appoint The Southland Frozen 
Meat and Produce Export Company Limited 
(with power of substitution by The Southland 
Frozen Meat and Produce Export Company 
Limited in favour of such person(s) as 
The Southland Frozen Meat and Produce 
Export Company Limited may appoint to act on 
its behalf) as attorney and agent to act 
for the transferor(s) and to do all matters 
of any kind or nature whatsoever in respect 
of or pertaining to the stock units specified 
in the Schedule as The Southland Frozen 
Meat and Produce Export Company Limited may 
think proper and expedient and which the 
transferor(s) could lawfully do or cause 
to be done including the appointment of a 
proxy or proxies for any meeting of The 
New Zealand Refrigerating Company Limited 
attendance in person thereat and voting 
thereat and the execution of all documents 
in the name of the transferor(s) which 
The Southland Frozen Meat and Produce Export 
Company Limited may consider necessary for 
all or any of the foregoing purposes." 
5.3 The power conferred by accepting offerees upon 
SFM to appoint persons to attend general meetings 
called by N.Z. Refrigerating, and to vote at those 
meetings in such manner as SFM may think proper and 
expedient, was important insofar as the principal 
defensive tactic adopted by N.Z. Refrigerating to 
counter the SFM bid was to seek a merger with a third 
company, Waitaki Industries Limited. As the Chairman 
of N.Z. Refrigerating pointed out in a statement 
made to the Stock Exchange on 17 March 19 65: 
• 
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"As any merger arrangements between the 
New Zealand Refrigerating Co Ltd and 
Waitaki Industries Ltd would, in certain 
circumstances, require the approval 
of a meeting of the New Zealand 
Refrigerating Co Ltd stockholders, it 
would be most dangerous for the Southland 
Company to have such a power to vote 
against any N.Z.R. merger with Waitaki." 
5.4 The terms of the power of attorney embodied in 
the form of acceptance of SFM's take-over offer 
were sufficiently wide to allow SFM to be able to 
exercise the vote of a N.Z. Refrigerating shareholder 
before SFM's offer was declared unconditional. 
However, the terms of the take-over offer made by 
SFM specifically provided that an offeree who accepted 
/ ., 
the offer could withdraw tbBir acceptance at any 
/ 
time prior to the offer being declared unconditional. 
5.5 As there is no right recognised by common law 
to vote by proxy, such a right depending for its 
existence upon the terms of the contract between 
a company and its members as expressed in its 
regulations, there must be strict compliance with the 
requirements of the offeree company if such a power 
of attorney is to be effective. For example, the 
instrument must be attested in the manner required 
by the articles, and must be deposited in the manner 
and within the time specified. However, providing 
there has been compliance with the requirements of the 
• 
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articles of the offeree company (which may require 
that only a member entitled to vote at a general 
meeting may be a proxy), there appears to be no 
reason why an offeree may not execute a power of 
attorney in favour of an offeror. ( 39 ) 
5.6 Where a power of attorney in favour of the 
offeree is embodied in the form of acceptance of the 
offer, that power of attorney may be expressed to 
be irrevocable. Where such a power of attorney is 
given for valuable consideration, the power may not 
be revoked at any time without the consent of the 
/ 
donee, nor is it revoked by the death, mental deficiency 
or bankruptcy of the donor. ( 40) If the power of 
attorney is expressed to be irrevocable for a fixed 
period not exceeding one year, then whether or not 
the power of attorney is given for valuable consideration, 
the power may not be revoked during the specified 
time and similarly it is not revoked by the death, 
mental deficiency or bankruptcy of the donor within 
that time. ( 4 l) 
5.7 Powers of attorney have been the subject of 
recent attention in the United Kingdom where the 
Powers of Attorney Act 1971 was passed following 
the recommendations of The Law Commission chaired 
by The Honourable Mr Justice Scarman. <42 ) Similarly, 
(39) For a discussion on proxies as a special form of 
power of attorney refer: , Alcock F. B. Powers of Attorney "\ 
Ch . VI I ( 19 3 5 ) . 
(40) Property Law Act 1952~ S.136 . (41) Ibid~ S.137. 
(42) Report on Powers of Attorney (1970) Law Com. No. 30. 
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in New South Wales, ( 43 ) and Ontario, ( 44 ) Law Reform 
Commissions have considered and reported upon the 
law relating to powers of attorney. However, no 
consideration has been given in these Reports 
to the manner in which a power of attorney may be 
used by an offeror to facilitate a take-over offer. 
The Eggleston Committee did not consider the matter 
and there is no provision regulating the use 
of powers of attorney in Part VIIBof the Companies 
Act 1961 (Commonwealth). The Macarthur Committee 
briefly referred in its report to the use of 
irrevocable powers of attorney, stating that while 
the Committee could see merit in the use of 
irrevocable powers of attorney once an offer has 
become unconditional, tbe use of such powers of 
attorney before the offer became unconditional 
was undesirable. ( 45 ) Accordingly the Committee 
recommended: 
"That voting by an offeror on behalf 
of an accepting offeree pursuant to 
an irrevocable power of attorney in 
general meetings of the offeree 
company before the offer has become 
unconditional be prohibited."(46) 
However, it may be considered appropriate that 
restrictions should be placed not only on the point 
(43) Report of the L.R.C. on Powers of Attorney L.R.C. 
18 (1974). 
(44) Report on Powers of Attorney (1972): Ontario L.R.C. 
(45) para 352. 
(46) para 360 (f). 
l \ 
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in time during a take-over scheme at which an 
offeror may vote on behalf of an accepting offeree 
at a general meeting of the offeree company 
pursuant to an irrevocable power of attorney, 
but that restrictions should also be placed 
on the scope of the power conferred in such a power 
of attorney. It would seem justifiable that 
the power of attorney should stipulate that it 
applies only to certain matters relating to the 
take-over offer and not simply recite that the 
offeror may do "all matters of any kind or nature 
whatsoever" which the offeree may do in respect 
of his shares in the offeree company. 
• 
36. 
NON-GENUINE OFFERS 
6.1 The Macarthur Committee gave consideration to the 
desirability of extending the provisions of the Act 
to prohibit a "bluffing bid" being made in an 
attempt to defeat a genuine take-over offer, or to 
distort the market price for shares in a company 
d · th of the b1.'d.<
47 ) Th C 'tt ur1.ng e currency e omm1. ee 
noted that the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers 
requires evidence to be produced guaranteeing the 
offeror's financial ability to carry out the 
take-over scheme, and the Report of the Eggleston 
Committee which stated: 
6.2 
"It has been suggested that some form 
of security might be required as evidence 
of good faith. We see practical 
difficulties in making such provision, 
but we think it should be an offence to 
make a take-over offer, or to give 
notice of intention to do so without 
having any real intention of doing so, 
or without having any reasonable or 
probable grounds of expectation of being 
able to provide the consideration for 
the offer or proposed offer. It would 
often ( but not always) be difficult to 
prove the offence, but the existence 
of such a provision would, we think, 
discourage the making of irresponsible 
announcements which could have the effect 
of creating a false market."(48) 
The recommendations of the Eggleston Committee 
have been adopted in Section 180Q of the Australian 
Companies Act which prohibits a person who does 
(47) para 356. 
(48) para 37. 
• 
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not intend to make a take-over offer from announcing 
that he intends to make such an offer. It also 
prohibits a person from making a take-over offer 
if he has no reasonable grounds for believing that 
he will be able to perform his obligations if the 
offer is accepted. 
6.3 The Macarthur Committee appeared to envisage 
the need for a similar legislative provision in 
New Zealand when they recommended "that it be 
constituted an offence to make a 'bluffing' or 
(49) 
non-genuine offer. However, it may be 
considered that, to some extent, Section 11 of the 
Act constitutes a deterent to the making of a 
take-over offer which is not bona fides. Subsection 
(2) of Section 11 provides that the offeree company 
may recover from the offerer "any expenses properly 
incurred by the offeree company, in relation to the 
take-over scheme .... ". In Canterbury Frozen Meat 
Company Limited v Waitaki Farmers Freezing Company 
Limited, ( 50) Wilson J. rejected the submission put 
forward by counsel for the defendant that the 
subsection covered only such expenditure as was 
incurred by the offeree company in fulfilling its 
obligations under the Act. As the learned Judge 
observed, if the intention of the Legislature had 
been to restrict the obligation of an offerer 
(49) para 36 0 (j). 
(50) [1972] N.Z.L.R. 806. 
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in this way, it could have specifically referred 
to the sections of the Act pursuant to which 
the expenditure had been incurred, instead of using 
"the rather indefinite words" adopted in subsection 
11(2) of the Act. ( 5l) The Court was also unable 
to accept the alternative submission that the only 
expenses contemplated by the Act in addition to 
those incurred by the offeree company in fulfilling 
its obligations under the Act were those expenses 
"coming within the objects of the offeree company 
or incidental thereto and expended bona fide in 
the interests of the company". As Wilson J. 
pointed out: 
"The purpose of the Act, as I read it, 
is to protect shareholders from making 
an unwise choice through ignorance or 
through collusion between the offeror 
and the directors of the offeree company. 
Any expenditure reasonably incurred 
by the company .... to achieve that 
purpose is properly incurred and may 
be recovered from the offeror under 
the authority of S.11(2), whether or 
not it is within the company's objects."(52) 
6.3 It appears from the decision in Canterbury Frozen 
Meat Company Limited v Waitaki Farmers' Freezing 
Company Limited( 53 ) that expenditure will be "properly 
incurred" for the purposes of Section 11(2) of the 
Act if it is expenditure incurred in fulfilling the 
offeree company's obligations under Section 5 or 
Section 7(2) of the Act: 
(51) Ibid: p.810. 
(52) Ibid: p.811. 
(53) Supra n.50. 
if the expenditure is 
e 
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incurred "in countering propoganda by the offeror 
which is calculated to influence the offeree's choice"; 
if it is incurred in protecting the interests of 
the offerees in relation to the take-over scheme; 
or if it is incurred in refunding directors expenses 
pursuant to Section 11(1) of the Act. 
6.4 It will be apparent that as a result of the 
provisions of Section 11 of the Act and the liberal 
interpretation that has been adopted in respect of 
that section, an offeror may assume responsibility 
for the payment of a reasonably large sum of money 
representing the expenses properly incurred by the 
offeree company in relation to the take-over scheme. (S 4 ) 
The prospect of such liability may act as a deterrent 
to potential offerors who intend making a take-over 
offer, but who would not be acting bona fides in so 
doing (and possibly to potential offerors who would 
be acting bona fides). However, much will depend 
on the circumstances surrounding the take-over scheme 
in question, as it may be the case that an offeror 
is prepared to take the risk of incurring expenses 
pursuant to Section 11 of the Act having regard 
to the possible gains to be made. 
(54) e.g. in circumstances such as the unsuccessful 
SFM bid in respect of N.Z. Refrigerating. 
40. 
THE EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACT 
7.1 Section 4(1) of the Act prohibits an offeror 
making a take-over offer unless it is made in 
compliance with the provisions of the Act. Section 
4(2) provides that a take-over offer sent to any 
offeree shall comply with the requirements of the 
First Schedule to the Act but, as Casey J. observed 
in Carr v New Zealand Refrigerating Co. Ltd, ( 55 ) 
"contains no specific words of prohibition". 
Section 12 of the Act makes it clear that, except 
as otherwise provided in the Act, ( 56 ) the parties 
to a take-over scheme may not contract out of the 
provisions of the Act. Section 13 of the Act 
provides for a penalty in the event of non-compliance 
with the provisions of the Act on the part of 
either an offeror, or an offeree company. The 
penalty is in the form of a fine not exceeding 
one thousand dollars. However, the Act does not 
specify whether a take-over scheme which contravenes 
the Act, because of a default on the part of either 
the offeror or the offeree company, may nevertheless 
be validly effected. 
7.2 The problem of whether non-compliance with 
the requirements of the Act has the effect of 
rendering a contract made in contravention of the 
(55) [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 135~ p.144. 
(56) S. 3(a). 
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Act void, was considered by Tompkins J. in 
Multiplex Industries Limited v Speer(
57 ) where it 
was held that such a contract was not only illegal, 
but unenforceable: 
"The attainment of the objects of the 
Act would not be effected if take-over 
offers in breach of the Act were 
nevertheless still effective and the 
company making the offer in contravention 
of the Act merely had to face a fine. 
I think the terms and objects of the 
Act make it clear that take-over offers 
made in contravention of the Act are 
not only illegal, but unenforceable!'(58) 
In the Court of Appeal, (
59 ) it was submitted on 
behalf of the offeror that a breach of the provisions 
of the Act concerning offers, although it may 
constitute an offence, does not have the effect of 
invalidating contracts made pursuant to the acceptance 
of such offers. However, the Court found that the 
offers made by the offeror in that case did not 
come within the scope of the Act, and therefore was 
not required to consider the question. Nevertheless, 
the view has been expressed that the Court of Appeal 
implicitly upheld the finding of Tompkins J. 
in the Court below. ( 60) 
7.3 The view expressed by Tompkins J. in Multiplex 
(61) 
Industries Limited v Speer may be contrasted with 
the approach adopted by Gillard J. in Colortone Holdings 
(57) [1965] N.Z.L.R. 592. 
(59) [1966] N.Z.L.R. 122. 
(58) Ibid; p.605. 
(60) Afterman & Baxt Cases and Materials on Corporations 
and Associations (1972); 571. 
(61) Supra; n.57. 
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Ltd v Calsil Ltd, ( 62 ) a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria. The latter case was concerned 
withJection 184 of the Companies Act 1961, (
63
) 
subsection (2) of which provided that no take-over 
offer could be made unless certain prescribed 
formalities were observed. As Gillard J. noted, 
"the language of Section 184 is quite mandatory 
in form". ( 64 ) Among the formalities required by 
the subsection to be observed, the offerer, 
Calsil Ltd, was bound to give the offeree company, 
Colortone Holdings Ltd, within a prescribed period, 
written notice of the take-over scheme, together 
with particulars of the terms of the take-over 
offers to be made pursuant to the scheme. When 
the take-over offers were made, they were to have 
attached to them a copy of the statement given 
to Colortone Holdings Ltd. (To this extent the 
provisions of Section 184(2) of the Commonwealth 
Act was similar to Section 4(1) and 4(2)(a) of 
the New Zealand Act). It was contended on behalf 
of Colortone Holdings Ltd that the terms of the 
offer made to the shareholders in that company 
were different from those communicated to it 
by Calsil Ltd. 
The learned Judge held that "the plaintiff .... has 
succeeded in showing that Calsil has breached the 
provisions of S.184 by making an offer to the 
(62) [1965] V.R. 129. 
(64) Supra~ at p.130. 
(63) see now Part VIIB of that Act. 
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Colortone shareholders in terms the particulars 
of which it had not informed Colortone by its 
1 , t' • • • II (65) ear ier no ice in writing. 
However, counsel for Colortone Holdings Ltd did 
not contend that an offer made in contravention 
of the section was null and void as being illegal, 
and the case proceeded on the basis that although 
the offers made by Calsil Ltd may not have complied 
with the requirements of the Act, they were 
nevertheless valid offers. For this reason it 
may be considered that the decision did not 
satisfactorily resolve the question of whether 
non-compliance with the Act in making a take-over 
offer renders a contract made upon the acceptance 
of the offer illegal and unenforceable. 
7.4 The decisions in Multiplex Industries Limited 
v Speer( 66 )and Colortone Holdings Limited v Calsil 
Ltd( 67 )have recently been considered in Carr v 
New Zealand Refrigerating Co. Ltd. (
68 ) It has been 
stated above how, faced with a take-over offer 
in respect of its shareholding by SFM, the directors 
of N.Z. Refrigerating sought a merger with Waitaki 
Industries Ltd in an endeavour to defeat the SFM 
bid. ( 69 ) In fact, the merger took the form of a 
(65) Supra; at p.137. 
(67) Supra; n.62. 
(69) para 5.3. 
(66) Supra; n.57. 
(68) Supra; n.55. 
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take-over offer by N.Z. Refrigerating for at 
least 75 per cent of the shares in Waitaki 
Industries Ltd. The plaintiffs, one a shareholder 
in Waitaki Industries Ltd and the other a 
stockholder in N.Z. Refrigerating, both employees 
of SFM, sought an order restraining N.Z. Refrigerating 
from proceeding with the take-over scheme on 
the ground that there had been a failure by 
the offeror to comply with the requirements of 
the Act. It was held that in carrying out the 
take-over scheme, N.Z. Refrigerating had failed 
to totally comply with the requirements of Section 
4(2) of the Act insofar as there had been an 
omission to provide information about the Stock 
Exchange listing of certain convertible debentures. 
Nevertheless, there had been substantial compliance 
with the requirements of the Act and "the only 
omission was of minor importance and unlikely 
to prejudice any offeree .... ". 
Casey J. was able to distinguish the approach 
adopted by Tompkins J. in Multiplex Industries 
Limited v Speer on the ground that in that case the 
Court was concerned with the enforcement of a 
contract in circumstances where the contract had 
been entered into following a "total failure" 
to comply with the requirements of the Act. He 
45. 
was therefore able to reject the submission advanced 
by counsel for the plaintiffs that the decision 
in Multiplex Industries Limited v Speer requires 
even the most trivial instances of non-compliance 
with the Act to have the effect of rendering a 
take-over offer void. The learned Judge referred 
to "the much quoted and commonsense warning by 
Devlin J. in St John Shipping Corporation v 
( 70) . 
Joseph Rank Ltd •... against a too-ready assumption 
of illegality or invalidity of contracts when 
dealing with statutes regulating commercial 
. (71) 
transactions". He also pointed out that the 
validity of a take-over offer where there had not 
been total compliance with the requirements of 
the Act was not determined simply by classifying 
a requirement as being directory or mandatory. 
Rather, it is necessary to consider the place 
of the requirement in the scheme of the Act and 
the degree and seriousness of the non-compliance: 
"In my view the aims and language of 
the Act suggest that in relating to the 
contents of the preliminary statement 
and the offer, the intention of S.4 is 
that the schedule should be substantially 
complied with, looking at the document 
as a whole in the light of the circum-
stances in each case. This can be 
achieved within the dichotomy of 
'mandatory' or 'directory' stipulations 
by holding that the requirements of 
(70) [1957] 1 Q.B. 267. 
(71) Supra; at p.145. 
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the schedule are 'directory' in the 
sense ..•. that substantial compliance 
is required. Alternatively (and more 
simply) I would prefer to say that 
Parliament intended these provisions 
to be substantially complied with; 
if they are not, subsequent transactions 
in the scheme are avoided."(72) 
7.5 In Carr v New Zealand Refrigerating Co Ltd, (
73 ) 
the failure to comply with the requirements of the 
Act was the omission of information in the take-over 
offer. It was not contended that there was any 
defect in the preliminary statement provided to 
the offeree company. In the course of his 
judgement, Casey J. placed some importance on the 
difference in wording between subsection (1) of 
Section 4 (concerning the provision of the preliminary 
statement to the offeree company) and subsection (2) 
of Section 4 (concerning the take-over offers 
sent to offerees). He pointed out that in Multiplex 
Industries Limited v Speer( 74 ) Tompkins J. "did 
not discuss the differences in wording between 
S.4(1) and S.4(2) and apparently treated them as 
both avoiding non-complying statements and offers". 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that in adopting 
a test of "substantial compliance", the learned 
Judge made no endeavour to distinguish between the 
application of that test to a failure to comply 
with subsection (1) and subsection (2) of Section 4 
of the Act. 
(72) Supra; p.148. 
(74) Supra; n.57. 
(73) Supra; n.55. 
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7.6 The effect of the decision in Carr v N.Z. 
Refrigerating Co. Ltd( 7S)appears to be that where 
there has been a total failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Act (because no preliminary 
notice has been given to the offeree company, or a 
statement has not been given to the offerees), the 
principal expounded by Tompkins J. in Multiplex 
Industries Limited v Speer( 76 )that take-over offers 
made in contravention of the Act are illegal, is 
still valid. However, if there has been a failure 
to fully comply with the requirements of the Act, 
but nevertheless there has been substantial compliance 
with those requirements, the take-over offer (and 
subsequent transactions) will not be invalid. In 
order to determine whether there has been substantial 
compliance with the requirements of the Act, it is 
necessary to look at the documents in question 
"as a whole in the light of the circumstances in 
each case". If the only omissions are of minor 
importance, and there is no evidence to suggest 
that any offeree has been prejudiced by these 
omission, then there will have been substantial 
compliance with the requirements of the Act. 
7.7 Where there has not been substantial compliance 
with the provisions of the Act in carrying out a 
take-over scheme, contracts entered into in the 
(75) Supra: n.55. 
(76) Supra: n.57. 
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course of that scheme will be illegal contracts. 
Pursuant to Section 6 of the Illegal Contracts Act 
1970, and subject to the provisions of the Act, 
every illegal contract( 77 ) "shall be of no effect 
and no person shall become entitled to any property 
made under a disposition made by or pursuant to 
any such contract". However, Section 7(1) of the 
Illegal Contracts Act provides that notwithstanding 
the provisions of Section 6 of that Act, any 
party to an illegal contract (or a person claiming 
through such party) may apply to the Court for 
relief. On such an application (or in the course 
of any proceedings) the Court may grant "relief 
by way of restitution, compensation, variation of 
the contract, validation of the contract in whole 
or part or for any particular purpose, or otherwise 
howsoever as the Court in its discretion thinks just". 
7.8 In Carr v New Zealand Refrigerating Co. Ltd, (
78 ) 
without discussing the point in any detail, Casey J. 
expressed the view that even if the omission 
in the statement provided by N.Z. Refrigerating to 
the shareholders in Waitaki Industries Ltd pursuant 
to Section 4(2) of the Act amounted to non-compliance 
with a mandatory requirement of the Act, having regard 
to the minor nature of the omission, relief would 
very likely have been available under the provisions 
(77) As defined in S.3. 
(78) Supra~ n.55. 
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of the Illegal Contracts Act in respect of any 
contract arising from the acceptance of N.Z. 
Refrigerating's offers. 
7.9 In considering whether the Court should grant 
relief pursuant to the Illegal Contracts Act, it 
is required by Section 7(3) of that Act to have 
regard to: 
"(a) The conduct of the parties~ and 
(b) In the case of the breach of an 
enactment, the object of the enactment 
and the gravity of the penalty expressly 
provided for any breach thereof~ and 
(c) Such other matters as it thinks 
proper ... " 
As McMullin J. observed in Dreadon v Fletcher 
Development Co. Ltd, (
79 ) 11 there is an overriding 
direction that the Court shall not grant relief 
if it considers that to do so would not be in the 
public interest". 
7.10 It would be interesting to speculate whether 
the provisions of the Commerce Act 1975 might have 
any effect on the granting of relief under the 
Illegal Contracts Act in respect of a contract 
arising out of an offer which does not comply 
with the requirements of the Act. Pursuant to 
the Commerce Act, a take-over scheme which constitutes 
(79) [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 11~20. 
so. 
an "aggregation proposal" coming within any of 
the classes described in the Third Schedule to 
that Act may not proceed unless the Minister of 
Trade and Industry consents to the proposal. Such 
consent will not be forthcoming if the Minister 
forms the view that the aggregation proposal may be 
. t th bl' ' ( 9 0) aga1ns e pu 1c interest. If the take-over 
scheme does not constitute an "aggregation proposal" 
coming within any of the classes described in the 
Third Schedule to the Commerce Act, the Minister 
may require the Commerce Commission to conduct 
an enquiry if (inter alia) "he considers that the 
merger or take-over may be or is likely to be 
contrary to the public interest .... 11 (
9 l) Section 21 
of the Commerce Act deems certain trade practices 
to be contrary to the public interest, while 
Section 73 of that Act provides: 
"In determining for the purposes of this 
Part of this Act whether the existence of 
any complete or partial monopoly or of 
any oligopoly or of any circumstances 
that are tending to bring about any complete 
or partial monopoly or oligopoly or whether 
any aggregation proposal or any merger 
or takeover is or is likely to be contrary 
to the public interest regard shall be 
had not only to the provisions of Section 
21 of this Act but also to any economic 
or other effects which any such monopoly, 
oligopoly, circumstances, aggregation 
proposal, merger, or takeover has or is 
likely to have on the well-being of the 
people of New Zealand and which would not 
take place in the absence of the monopoly, 
(80) Sections 66-69. (81) s. 70. 
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oligopoly, circumstances, aggregation 
proposal, merger, or takeover." 
The element of public interest in a take-over scheme 
is therefore closely associated with considerations 
of social policy, including economic and political 
considerations. The question therefore arises 
of whether, if the Minister has consented to a 
take-over scheme (or has not required an enquiry 
to be held if his consent is not a pre-requisite 
to the take-over scheme), the Court would be likely 
to find that to grant relief under the Illegal 
Contracts Act would not be in the public interest. 
Perhaps it could be expected that for the purposes 
of the Illegal Contracts Act the Court would 
adopt a more restrictive view of the expression 
"public interest" and rather than consider broad 
issues of social policy, confine its attention 
to the objects of shareholder protection and the 
maintenance of confidence in the share market 
intended to be secured by the Act. While a 
take-over scheme may be in the public interest, it 
may cease to be in the public interest if it is 
not carried out in accordance with the requirements 
of the Act. 
7.11 Apart from the power to grant relief under 
the Illegal Contracts Act, the Court may grant 
/ 
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an injunction in respect of a take-over scheme 
which is carried out in breach of the requirements 
of the Act. However, in Carr v New Zealand Refrigerating 
Co. Ltd< 32 ) Casey J. held that "infringement of 
S.4 of the Act, not invalidating the offer, does 
not confer any right to an injunction on an offeree, 
nor constitute such a threat to his proprietary 
interest as to support such a right". <
33 ) The 
learned Judge pointed out, however, that it does 
not necessarily follow that no such right will 
exist where the offer has been invalidated by a 
substantial failure to comply with the Act. It was 
also held that a shareholder in an offeror company 
has no right to an injunction against the offeror 
as in failing to comply with requirements of the Act 
the offeror company is not acting ultra-vires. 
7.12 In Australia, Part VIIB of the Companies Act 
1961 contains specific provisions regulating the 
failure to comply with the provisions of that part of 
that Act. Pursuant to section 180R, the Court 
now has power, where it is satisfied that a provision 
in Part VIB of the Act has not been complied with, 
to make "such orders as it thinks necessary or 
expedient to protect the rights of person affected 
by the take-over scheme". Included in the orders 
that the Court may make are: 
(82) [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 135. (83) Ibid~ p.149. 
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"(a) an order restraining the registration 
of transfers of shares in the offeree 
company; 
(b) an order restraining the disposal of 
any interest in shares in the offeree 
company; 
(c) an order cancelling a contract, 
arrangement or offer relating to the 
take-over scheme; 
(d) an order declaring a contract, 
arrangement or offer relating to the 
take-over scheme to be voidable; and 
(e) for the purpose of securing compliance 
with any other order under this section, 
an order directing a person to do or 
refrain from doing a specified act."(84) 
In addition, Section 180S allows the Court to excuse 
non-compliance with the Act resulting from 
inadvertence, mistake, or circumstances beyond the 
control of the person who has brought about the 
failure to comply where it is satisfied that the 
failure ought to be excused. However, before making 
an order pursuant to Section 180R, or an order 
under Section 180S declaring an act or matter not 
to be invalid, Section 180T requires the Court 
to be satisfied that any order made would not 
unfairly prejudice any person. 
l ) 
l I I 
(84) For an illustration of the application of S.180R 
see A.G for the State of Victoria v Walsh's Holdings 
Limited [1973] V.R. 137. 
tr'T 
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CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCES AND THE BRIERLEY BIDS 
FOR NORTHERN STEAM 
8.1 Most take-over offers will be expressed to be 
conditional upon the acceptance of the offer in respect 
of a minimum number of shares. It is therefore 
required by paragraph (b) of Part B of the First 
Schedule to the Act that the take-over offer must 
specify whether or not the offer is conditional 
upon acceptances being received in respect of 
a minimum number of shares, and, if so, that 
minimum number. The Macarthur Committee noted 
that a practice has developed whereby the number 
of shares it is sought to acquire is stated, but 
with a qualification added allowing the offeror 
to accept a lesser number of shares if he should 
d 
. ( 85) 
so esire. 
8.2 An interesting example of this practice is 
to be found in the take-over offer made in February 
1970 by Brierley Investments Limited to the shareholders 
of The Northern Steam Ship Company Limited. 
8.3 The Northern Steam Ship Company Limited ("Northern 
Steam") was a company with a poor record of earnings 
during the ten year period prior to the take-over 
bid being made by Brierley Investments Limited. 
(85) para 351. 
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The highest profit it had made during this period 
was $130,000. The average dividend paid during 
the seven year period prior to the take-over 
bid was 3.2 per cent per annum and no dividend had 
been declared for the financial years ending 
31 July 1968 and 31 July 1969. The earnings on 
shareholders funds during those two years had been 
respectively 3.2 per cent and 1.4 per cent. At the 
date the take-over offer was made, one dollar shares 
in Northern Steam were trading at 72 cents. The 
result of the company's activities was such that 
in August 1969 one shareholder in the company, 
much to the displeasure of the directors, was 
seeking appointment as proxy by other shareholders 
in order to secure the passing of a resolution at 
a general meeting of the company approving the 
appointment of an independent consultant to 
determine why the company was no longer profitable. 
However, while Northern Steam may not have been 
providing much by way of a return in the form of 
dividends to its shareholders, the net value 
of the company's assets was approximately $2.8 
million, the result being that each one dollar 
Northern Steam share represented assets of $1.61. 
This gave rise to speculation that the company would 
go into liquidation, or at least make a partial 
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return of capital from the sale of its assets. 
The company was therefore an obvious target for 
a take-over. 
8.4 In February 1970, Brierley Investments Limited 
made a formal take-over offer to the shareholders 
of Northern Stearn. For every five shares in 
Northern Stearn, the shareholder was offered one 
50 cent share in the offeror company and one dollar 
in cash. (In fact, therefore, the offer was for 
10 cents of Brierley Investments Capital and 20 cents 
cash for each Northern Stearn share). As shares 
in Brierley Investments Limited were being traded 
at $3.85 immediately prior to the making of the 
take-over offer, the value of the offer was 97 cents 
for each Northern Stearn share. The value of this 
offer exceeded any share price for Northern Stearn 
since 1962. The offer was expressed to be in 
respect of all the 82~221 one dollar shares in 
Northern Stearn, although at the date the take-over 
offer was made, the offeror had already acquired 
84,792 shares in Northern Stearn through purchases 
made on the market. As the offeror company was 
seeking to acquire sufficient shares in Northern 
Stearn to be able to exercise control of more than 
half the voting power at a general meeting of 
Northern Stearn, the offer was expressed to be 
conditional upon the acceptance of sufficient shares 
to give it this power. However, Brierley Investments 
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Limited attempted to reserve the right to acquire 
a lesser number of shares if it so desired. 
The clause in the take-over offer purporting to 
comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) 
of Part B of the First Schedule stated: 
"the offer is conditional upon 
acceptances in respect of a minimum 
number of 335,000 shares (or such 
smaller number as Brierley Investments 
may nominate by written notice to 
Northern Steamship)". 
The offer was to remain open until 30 March 1970. 
8.5 The initial reaction of the directors of 
Northern Steamship to this offer was to declare 
the proposed consideration "totally inadequate" 
and to recommend a rejection by the offerees of 
the take-over offer. A 2 per cent interim dividend 
declared in December 1969 allowed the directors 
to call attention to the "vast improvement in the 
trading position of the company". The directors 
were also able to anticipate a tax paid profit 
for the year ending 31 March 1970 in excess of 
$100,000 (compared with $10,072 in 1969) and a 
final dividend of 8 per cent. 
8.6 By March 1970 the value of shares in Brierley 
Investments Limited had risen to $4.50 which meant 
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that the effective price offered for Northern 
Steam shares was $1.04 per share. Then, for 
the first time, the directors of Northern Steam 
alleged that by declaring the offer to be conditional 
upon the acceptance of a minimum number of shares 
or such lesser number of shares as the offerer 
may nominate, Brierley Investments Limited had 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Act. 
Brierley Investments Limited was given notice 
of the alleged failure to comply with the requirements 
of the Act by Northern Steam, and asked to withdraw 
its offer to Northern Steam shareholders. When 
Brierley Investments Limited failed to respond, 
Northern Steam sought a ruling from the Court 
on the validity of the take-over offer. Shareholders 
were advised by Northern Steam that contracts 
arising from the take-over bid "may be unenforceable". 
Brierley Investments Limited refuted the allegation 
that its offer did not comply with the requirements 
of the Act, but one month later advised Northern 
Steam that the number of shares required to be 
accepted before the offer became unconditional 
was one share. At the same time Northern Steam was 
advised the take-over offer was unconditional. 
8.7 The date for the Court hearing to determine the 
legality of the take-over offer by Brierley Investments 
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Limited was 6 May 1970. However, on 29 April 1970, 
the directors of Northern Steam wrote to shareholders 
advising them that an agreement had been reached 
between Northern Steam and Brierley Investments Limited. 
Under the terms of the agreement, Brierley Investments 
Limited (or its Chairman) was not to hold more than 
25 per cent of the ordinary shares in Northern Steam 
"either now or at any time in the future". The 
letter pointed out that Brierley Investments Limited 
had entered into a contract to this effect, and that 
"the holding by Brierley Investments together with 
the holdings of ... directors makes it extremely 
improbable that Northern Steam could, in the future, 
be the subject of a successful take-over, unless it 
was clearly to the advantage of all shareholders". 
The Chairman of Brierley Investments Limited was invited 
to join the board of Northern Steam. 
8.8 ' Unfortunately, the legality of the take-over 
offer made by Brierley Investments Limited was never 
tested judicially. However, it would appear that, 
notwithstanding the claim made by the Chairman 
of Brierley Investments Limited that his legal advisors 
considered the take-over offer complied with the 
requirements of the Act, ( 86 ) the take-over offer did 
not conform with the requirements of the Act insofar 
as the offeror attempted to reserve to itself a 
(86) "Dominion" 14 March 1970. 
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right to acquire a number of shares less than the 
number of acceptances in respect of which the offer 
was stated to be conditional. It has been stated 
above( 37 )that once a take-over offer has been made, 
that offer may not be varied without the need for 
further compliance with the Act except to the extent 
permitted by Section 9(1) of the Act. Section 9(l)(a) 
permits a variation of the amount of cash offered 
for the shares that it is proposed to acquire~ 
lection 9(l)(b) permits a variation in the time that 
the offer is to remain open for acceptance. Section 
9(2) of the Act requires notice of any such variation 
to be given to the offeree company. From the wording 
of Bection 9 of the Act it would appear that the 
section is intended to be exhaustive as to the manner 
in which an offer may be varied without the need 
once again to follow the procedure prescribed by the 
Act. As any variation in the number of acceptances 
upon which an offer to acquire shares is conditional 
is in effect a variation of the terms of the offer, 
and as any such variation is not permitted by the 
Act, to purport to alter the number of acceptances 
upon which an offer is conditional must be in breach 
of the Act. However, the position is not as clear 
where an offerer attempts to reserve the right to 
reduce the number of acceptances upon which an offer 
is conditional, but does not attempt to exercise 
that right. However, as has also been stated above, (
33 ) 
it does not necessarily follow that contracts arising 
(87) para 4.1. (88) para 7.1 et. seq. 
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out of a take-over offer which contravene the 
requirements of the Act will necessarily be 
unenforceable, either by offeror or offeree, because 
of their element of illegality. 
8.9 The Macarthur Committee expressed the view 
that stating an offer to be conditional upon 
acceptances being received in respect of a minimum 
number of shares and qualifying that statement 
by specifying that the offeror may accept a lesser 
number of shares is "wrong and without statutory 
authority". (
39 ) Accordingly the Committee recommended 
that the Act should prohibit such a practice. (
9 o) 
8.10 In the United Kingdom, the London City Code 
on Take-overs and Mergers provides that an offer 
may not be made for the whole of the equity share 
capital of a company, or a proportion of that capital 
which, if the offer is accepted in full, would result 
in the offeror being in a position to exercise 
more than half the voting power at a general meeting 
of the offeree company, unless that offer is stated 
to be conditional upon the offeror acquiring (or 
agreeing to acquire) by the close of the offer shares 
conferring over half the voting power at a general 
meeting of the company. Accordingly, no such offer 
may be declared unconditional unless the offeror has 
(89) para 351. (90) para 360(e). 
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acquired (or agreed to acquire) more than 50 per cent 
. (91) 
of the voting rights attributable to the share capital. 
8.11 In Australia, the matter has been approached 
differently. The Eggleston Committee took the 
view that if a condition is attached to an offer 
to the effect that the offer is conditional upon 
acceptance in respect of a minimum number of shares, 
neither offeror nor offeree should be bound unless 
the condition is fulfilled. (
92 ) If, however, the 
offeror expressed the offer to be subject to the 
offeror's right to declare the offer unconditional 
in respect of any lesser number of shares than the 
minimum number specified in the take-over offer, 
the offeror should have the option of declaring 
the offer unconditional in respect of that lesser 
number of shares and thereby bind those offerees 
who had accepted the offer. 
8.12 Under legislation in force at the time of the 
Eggleston Committee's deliberations, the offeror 
was required to specify in the take-over offer the 
last day on which the offer could be declared to be 
free from a condition requiring the acceptance 
of the offer in respect of a minimum number of shares, 
and to allow a further period of not less than 
seven days during which the offer remained open 
for acceptance.( 93 ) 
(91) 
(93) 
10th 
Rule 20. (92) para 38. 
Companies Act 1961 (Commonwealth) Cl.4 Pt.A 
Sched. 
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Shareholders who had not decided whether they should 
accept the offer were therefore given a period 
of time in which they could accept the offer, 
knowing that the offer had become unconditional in 
respect of some of the members of the offeree company. 
However, as the Eggleston Committee pointed out, 
while the offerees will know how many shares were 
held by the offeror at the date the take-over 
offer was made, they have no means of knowing how 
many further shares the offeror has acquired by the 
time the offer is declared unconditional. ( 94 ) 
The Committee therefore recommended that where a 
take-over offer has been made conditional upon 
acceptances being received in respect of a minimum 
number of shares and the offeror has reserved the 
right to declare the offer unconditional in respect 
of acceptances received, for a lesser number of 
shares, the offeror should be required to comply 
with certain disclosure requirements when the offer 
is declared unconditional. The procedure recommended 
by the Committee was for the offeror to publish, 
on or before the date specified in the take-over offer 
as the last date on which the offeror may declare the 
offer to be unconditional, a notice in a newspaper 
in general circulations in the appropriate State 
containing a declaration to the effect that the offer 
had been freed from any condition as to a minimum 
number of acceptances and including a statement of the 
(94) para 39. 
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total number of shares which the offeror knows 
to have been acquired, either by him or on his behalf. 
A similar notice would be required to be provided 
to each Stock Exchange on which the shares of the 
offeree are listed. <95 ) 
8.13 The Eggleston Committee also recommended that 
in any case in which a take-over offer has been 
declared conditional upon acceptances in respect 
of a minimum number of shares having been received, 
the offeror should be required to declare whether 
the condition has been fulfilled within 24 hours 
of the date stated by the take-over offer to be 
the latest date upon which the offer may be declared 
unconditional. ( 9 6 ) Such a declaration would be 
required whether or not a declaration had already 
been made in respect of the acceptance of a lesser 
number of shares than that specified in the 
take-over offer. It would be required to state the 
total number of shares which the offeror had acquired 
to date. Failure to comply with these requirements 
would mean the take-over offer would lapse, unless 
the condition had in fact been fulfilled. (
97 ) 
8.14 These recommendations of the Eggleston Committee 
have, in substance, been enacted in Section 180N of 
the Companies Act 19 61, the result being that offerees 
who may wish to accept a take-over offer in respect 
(95) para 4l(a). 
(97) para 4l(c). 
(9 6 ) para 4l(b). 
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of their shares only if it appears that they will 
be ultimately left as a small minority, will 
receive adequate information on the degree of success 
of the take-over offer and on the basis of this 
information will have at least seven days in which 
to decide whether to accept the offer. However, 
pursuant to Section 180N(8) of that Act, where an 
offeror has failed to publish the notice required 
by the section, "all contracts formed by the 
acceptance of take-over offers under the take-over 
scheme are void". While this provision may seem 
h h . h . d . . d ( 98) ars , in Re Nort ern Territory Lan Company Limite 
Zeilling J. made an order pursuant to Section 36 6 of 
the Companies Act 1961 enlarging the time within 
which the notice required by Section 180N of the 
Act could be published and the period for which the 
take-over offer should remain open. Section 366 
of the Australian Act provides that no proceedings 
under the Act shall be invalidated "by any defect 
irregularity or deficiency of notice or time" unless 
the Court is of the opinion that because of the 
failure to comply some substantial injustice has 
been brought about which the Court is unable to 
remedy by the making of an order. The learned Judge 
stated that he had "grave doubts" as to the application 
(99) 
of Section 180S of the Act in its application to 
a failure to comply with the requirements of Section 180N 
(98) (1972) 6 S.A.S.R. 611. 
(99) supra para 7.12. 
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"because Section 180N has its own built-in subsection 
. (100) 
relating to failure to comply". 
8.15 If it is accepted that some amendment to the 
law in New Zealand is necessary, the choice 
as to the form which that amendment should take 
appears to be between two alternatives. The first 
is to adopt the approach taken by the Macarthur 
Committee that for a take-over offer to specify 
that it is conditional upon acceptances being 
received in respect of a minimum number of shares 
"or such lesser number as the offerer may determine" 
is a practice which should be expressly prohibited 
by the Act. (lOl) The second is to follow the 
Australian approach and to permit such offers, 
but subject to providing adequate safeguards to 
ensure that offerees are fully informed on the 
progress of the take-over bid. If it may also be 
accepted that the principal object of the Act is not 
to discourage take-over bids, but to ensure that 
shareholders are provided with adequate information 
concerning the offer and to have time in which to 
study the offer and, if necessary, obtain independent 
advice, it is submitted that the Australian approach 
is to be preferred. 
8.16 That this whole issue is not merely of academic 
interest may be illustrated by referring to the sequel 
to the take-over bid made in February 1970 by 
(100) supra; p. 614. (101) para 360(e). 
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Brierley Investments Limited for the shares in 
Northern Steam. In February 1976 , Brierley Investments 
Limited, pursuant to Section 4(1) of the Act, 
gave notice to the directors of Northern Steam that 
it intended making a take-over offer in respect of 
all the 829,221 shares in Northern Steam that it 
did not already own. On 8 March 1976 a formal 
take-over offer was made to the shareholders in 
Northern Steam. The offer was a cash offer of $1.45 
for each ordinary share of $1 in the offeree company 
and was not conditional upon acceptances being 
received in respect of anyminimum number of shares. 
While pointing out that they would be prepared 
to consider a rival bid, on 9 March 1976 the directors 
of Northern Steam recommended that offerees accept 
the offer from Brierley Investments Limited because 
of "certain circumstances confronting the company", 
presumably a reference to the uncertainty surrounding 
the sale of certain assets and substantial tax 
liabilities. The directors pointed out that while 
the return from assets on a controlled liquidation 
of Northern Steam would exceed the offer of $1.45 
per share by approximately 70 cents, if the cash 
offer was accepted, "this would represent certain 
cash in a shareholder's hands". 
While an endeavour was made by a Northern Steam 
shareholder to acquire a large number of Northern Steam 
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shares on the market, no rival bid was forthcoming. 
On 13 March 1976 it was announced that Brierley 
Investments Limited had gained control of 429,996 
shares in Northern Stearn, giving Brierley Investments 
Limited the right to exercise approximately 51 per cent 
of the voting power at a general meeting of Northern 
Stearn. Two nominees of Brierley Investments Limited 
joined the Chairman of that company on the board 
of directors of Northern Stearn. The total cost 
of the transaction to Brierley Investments Limited 
was estimated at $1.4 million, (l0 2 ) $168,000 of this 
having been incurred in 1970 in acquiring a 25 per 
cent share holding in Northern Stearn and the balance 
in the 1976 bid. While the exact value of the 
assets of Northern Stearn has not been publicised, 
the directors of that company have stated that it 
(103) 
could be between $1.99 and $2.20 per share. 
8.17 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that Brierley 
Investments Limited's first take-over offer may 
be considered to have contravened the requirements 
of the Act insofar as it was expressed to be 
conditional upon the acceptance of the offer in respect 
of a minimum number of shares or such lesser number 
as the offeror might nominate, and notwithstanding 
the fact that when confronted with this possible 
illegality Brierley Investments Limited undertook 
( 102) "Dominion 11 21 February 19 76. 
(103) Ibid. 
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not to hold more than 25 per cent of the ordinary 
shares in Northern Steam either at the time the 
undertaking was given or at any time in the future, 
Brierley Investments Limited was able to succeed 
in acquiring voting control in Northern Steam. 
While one effect of the undertaking given in 1970 
may have been to secure for Northern Steam shareholders 
a better price for their shares when Brierley 
Investments Limited eventually acquired a majority 
of the voting shares in Northern Steam, to some 
extent those same shareholders may have been 
prejudiced insofar as the 25 per cent acquisition 
by Brierley Investments Limited in 1970, made it 
unlikely that any counter bidder could succeed 
against Brierley Investments Limited in 1976 , 
thus leaving Brierley Investments Limited reasonable 
freedom to name their price. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Having regard to the manner in which take-over 
schemes are regulated to by statute in Australia 
and other jurisdictions, and to some of the deficiencies 
that have become apparent in the Act, it is suggested 
that it would be appropriate if the Legislature 
in New Zealand gave consideration to extensively 
amending the Act in order that it may more appropriately 
regulate take-over schemes and control a number 
of practices which have developed in recent years. 
9.2 Clearly there can be little justification for 
distinguishing between oral take-over offers and 
written take-over offers in determining whether 
the Act is to apply. 
9.3 While it is not easy to determine the degree 
of control at which the Act should become operational, 
having regard to the A.S.P. bid in respect of 
a minority shareholding in A.B. Consolidated, the 
figure of 25 per cent or more (of the voting shares 
in a company) recommended by the Macarthur Committee 
would appear to be the minimum acceptable figure. 
9.4 While 'first come, first served' bids appear 
to be within the scope of the Act, it seems that 
further legislative control of such bids is 
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desirable. While the Stock Exchange has developed 
its own rules in order to regulate invitations to 
make an offer to sell shares, the A.S.P. bid 
in respect of a minority shareholding in A.B. Consolidated 
indicates that these rules alone are not satisfactory. 
9.5 Where the offeror has increased the value 
of a take-over offer, in circumstances where the 
Stock Exchange rule does not apply, it is suggested 
that it is not adequate to rely upon the "goodwill" 
of the offeror to ensure that all shareholders 
will be entitled to receive the higher price to be 
paid for the shares in the offeree company. Australian 
legislation affords the shareholder adequate 
protection by requiring that if the value of an 
offer is increased, all accepting offerees receive 
the benefit. 
9.6 As there may be considerable gains to be made 
in a take-over bid, and as those gains may be at 
the expense of the shareholders in the offeree company, 
it appears desirable that the Act should seek to 
discourage the making of a take-over offer which 
is not made in good faith. 
9.7 It also appears desirable that close consideration 
should be given to the use of powers of attorney 
in favour of an offeror which are commonly included 
in the form of acceptance of an offer. Such 
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consideration could form part of a general enquiry in 
to the law relating to powers of attorney. 
9.8 The law concerning the effect of non-compliance 
with the requirements of the Act has recently been 
clarified by the Court. However, it would appear 
more satisfactory if the Act was amended to specify 
those powers that the Court may exercise where 
there has been non-compliance with the requirements 
of the Act. 
9.9 Take-over offers which are expressed to be 
conditional upon acceptances being received in 
respect of a stated minimum number of shares, 
with an attempt by the offeror to reserve the right 
to accept a lesser number of shares, appear to be 
in need of strict legislative control if offerees 
are to be protected from undesirable practices 
adopted in the course of a take-over scheme. If 
the choice is between the prohibition of such a 
practice, and its strict control to ensure that 
shareholders interests are protected, the latter 
alternative appears more desirable. 
9.10 It is not intended to suggest that the concepts 
on which the Act has been designed are in any way 
unsatisfactory. Rather, it is a case of the need 
to extend the protection at present afforded by 
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the Act. This can only be achieved by the enactment 
of a comprehensive amendment to the Act similar 
to that effected in Australia by the repeal of 
Section 184 of the Companies Act 1961 and the 
enactment of part VIIB of that Act. With the 
enactment of the Commerce Act 1975 intended to 
protect the element of "public interest" in take-over 
schemes, it may be considered an opportune time 
to undertake a review of the Companies Amendment Act 
1963 to provide further protection to shareholders 
in an offeree company. 
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